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Home institutional imprinting and lobbying expenditure of foreign firms: 
Moderating effects of experience and technological intensity 
 
Abstract The issue of whether a firm’s ‘home’ environment influences its nonmarket 
activities in a ‘host’ country is being increasingly discussed in the international business 
literature. In this paper, we use institutional and organisational imprinting theories to argue that 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) founded in countries with stronger regulatory institutions are 
likely to spend more on lobbying in a host country as compared to MNEs founded in countries 
with weaker regulatory institutions. We also argue that this effect is moderated by the MNE’s 
overall experience, its experience within the host country, and its technological intensity. We 
test our hypotheses using a sample of 378 foreign MNEs (among the largest 500) operating in 
the United States (U.S.), spanning the 8 year period 2006-2013, and representing 29 home 
countries. Our results support our hypothesis on the relationship between home-institutional 
imprinting and overseas lobbying expenditure, as described above. Our results also support our 
arguments that MNEs’ overall experience and technological intensity reduce the imprinting 
effect of home institutions on lobbying expenditure; however, our moderating effect of host-
country experience on this relationship is not supported.  
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 Scholars have acknowledged that the strategic actions of firms are often determined by 
the institutional conditions faced by them at the time of their founding (Kriauciunas and Kale, 
2006;Stinchcombe, 1965). Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) locate their value-chain activities 
in multiple institutional contexts, and therefore face a multitude of nonmarket stakeholders in 
various countries, such as changing governments with conflicting agendas, changing social 
needs and changing attitudes of local business communities (Simon, 1984;Kobrin, 1979). 
MNEs are known to manage such institutional idiosyncrasies over time exogenously, for 
instance, via sequential stages of entry (Delios and Henisz, 2003b, a) and by engaging in 
nonmarket activities to influence host-governments for preferential access and exclusivity 
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994;Doh, Lawton and Rajwani, 2012). An important issue that 
remains under-explored in this context is that, while MNEs learn to adapt to the demands of the 
nonmarket environment in various host countries, to what extent does the ‘imprinting’ effect of 
their nonmarket capabilities developed at home influences their nonmarket behaviour in host 
countries. 
 Lobbying, defined as the transfer of information between firms and policymakers, has 
been regarded as an important form of nonmarket strategy (De Figueiredo and Richter, 
2013;Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004;Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman and Eden, 2006). Although 
lobbying has been traditionally studied under the umbrella of corporate political activities 
(CPAs) i.e. to serve a firm’s self-interests by demanding favorable policies from the 
government (Hillman et al., 2004;Lawton, McGuire and Rajwani, 2013a;Schuler, Rehbein and 
Cramer, 2002), scholars have argued that lobbying is also a part of firms’ social responsibility 
(e.g. Hamilton and Hoch, 1997;Keffer and Hill, 1997;Wood, 1985). Wood (1985), for instance, 
argues that lobbying enables firms to promote the interests of various stakeholders, such as of 
customers in demanding quality goods, of employees of having continued jobs and incomes, 
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and of shareholders of expecting reasonable profits. Lobbying thus provides a legitimate 
mechanism for MNEs to address their social as well as political needs in their home and host 
environments.   
 Prior research on MNEs’ overseas lobbying has largely focussed on the institutional 
characteristics of ‘host countries’ – e.g. the (un)availability of legitimate mechanisms to lobby 
(via information exchange) and the extent to which MNEs learn to develop alternative, locally 
accepted mechanisms to voice their opinions to the host-government (Henisz, 2003;Holburn 
and Zelner, 2010;Hillman and Wan, 2005;Zhou, Poppo and Yang, 2008;Xin and Pearce, 
1996;Lawton, Rajwani and Doh, 2013b). An important assumption made in these studies is that 
MNEs would use lobbying as a mechanism in a host country if legitimate business-government 
interfaces were available for such activity. We first suggest that, blending this work with 
‘organisational imprinting’ perspectives (Stinchcombe, 1965) could be a way forward in 
understanding how an MNE’s ‘home environment’ affects its overseas lobbying. Having its 
roots in biology, imprinting is the durable influence of certain experiences and knowledge 
developed at the time of founding on an organisation’s approach to new situations. Studies 
suggest that depending on the nature of MNEs’ home-institutions, managers develop specific 
capabilities and routines to interact with external stakeholders. In this context, stronger home 
institutions encourage lobbying, whereas institutional ‘voids’ encourage the use of bribery and 
other mechanisms by firms (Campos and Giovannoni, 2007). We suggest that due to imprinting 
effects of home-institutions, MNEs founded in such contexts would develop ‘mental models’ 
of interacting with the government (Denzau and North, 1994;Holburn and Zelner, 
2010;Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006;Boddewyn, 2015) and that, these are likely to extend to 
MNEs’ overseas operations. Therefore, our first research question is: To what extent does home-
institutional imprinting affect foreign firms’ lobbying expenditure in a host country?   
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 Second, we suggest that ‘MNEs’ experience’ - both overall and host-country specific, 
and their ‘technological intensity’ moderate the relationship between home-institutional 
imprinting and overseas lobbying behaviour. Imprinting theory suggests that firms are more 
vulnerable to external pressures during ‘developmental stages’ – i.e. newer firms have greater 
imprinting effects than older firms (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983). As MNEs generally 
grow older, they develop ‘generic’ political knowledge, reducing the imprinting effects of 
institutional conditions at the time of founding (Blumentritt and Rehbein, 2008;Delios and 
Henisz, 2003a;Henisz, 2003;Holburn and Zelner, 2010;Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 2015). 
Likewise, as MNEs gain experience in a specific host-country, they are likely to gain deeper 
and more ‘institution-specific’ political knowledge of the host country (Boddewyn, 
2015;Buckley and Boddewyn, 2015). We argue that, in general, experience reduces home-
institutional imprinting effects in overseas lobbying. We also acknowledge the possibility that 
the imprinting effects of home-institutions vary among different types of firms. In this context, 
we suggest that the technological intensity of the MNE is an important variable, as previously 
acknowledged (e.g. Hsu and Lim, 2013). This is because, technologically intensive MNEs tend 
to be embedded in multiple institutional contexts, and this reduces the imprinting effect of 
home-institutions. Overall, this leads us to our second research question: To what extent do 
experience and technological intensity moderate the relationship between home-institutional 
imprinting and lobbying expenditure of foreign firms in a host country? 
 In this paper, we focus on the ‘regulatory’ (i.e. formal) characteristics of home-
institutions, although institutions comprise of regulatory, cognitive and normative pillars (Scott, 
1995). This is because, first, various studies suggest that regulatory factors are more likely to 
have an impact on corporate political behaviour in comparison to normative and cognitive 
factors (Campos and Giovannoni, 2007;Harstad and Svensson, 2011;Mondejar and Zhao, 
2013). Also, regulative factors are coercive and cannot be taken for granted by firms, and are 
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therefore likely to have a greater imprinting effect. In addition, scholars have argued that 
focussing on all three pillars of institutions provides a rather broad basis for analysis, leading 
to oversimplification (Zaheer, Schomaker and Nachum, 2012).  
Our primary contribution lies in advancing theory on cross-border lobbying and we do 
so by examining the extent to which the nature of regulatory institutions in the home-country 
affects MNEs’ lobbying expenditures in the host country. To test our hypotheses, we focus on 
the United States (U.S.) as a context, because lobbying has been recognised as a legitimate 
activity for foreign firms in the U.S. since decades, while other mechanisms of political activity 
such as contributions to Political Action Committees (PACs) have been legitimised for foreign 
MNEs recently (Levitt, 2015). Overall, by combining institutional theory with organisational 
imprinting perspectives, we complement existing knowledge about the determinants of cross-
border lobbying, that has, so far, largely focussed on the characteristics of, and mechanisms 
available in ‘host countries’. We also offer new pathways for research on nonmarket strategy 
by majorly drawing upon a new theory (i.e. organisational imprinting), which has, to date, not 
been discussed in the context of lobbying. We also contribute by integrating experiential 
learning perspectives (Delios and Beamish, 2001;Delios and Henisz, 2003b); in that, we 
suggest that experience enables MNEs to develop localised political capabilities and minimise 
home imprinting effects in lobbying. Finally, by examining the moderating effect of MNEs’ 
technological intensity on the relationship between institutional-imprinting and overseas 
lobbying, we contribute to studies that focus on the importance of MNEs’ multiple 
embeddedness (Figueiredo, 2011;Meyer, Mudambi and Narula, 2011) for lobbying 
internationally (Blumentritt and Rehbein, 2008;Hillman and Wan, 2005;Puck, Rogers and 
Mohr, 2013;Shirodkar and Mohr, 2015b).  
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In the following sections, we formulate our hypotheses on the relationship between 
home-institutional imprinting and lobbying expenditure, and on the moderating effects of 
experience and technological intensity. We then describe our data and present our findings. 
Finally, we discuss our results, and conclude our paper by highlighting our contributions, 
limitations and suggesting worthwhile avenues for future research. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
We combine insights from two theories – institutional theory and organisational 
imprinting theory – to develop our hypotheses. First, the institutional theory suggests that 
‘regulatory, normative and cognitive’ elements of the external environment determine strategic 
choices of firms - such as ownership strategies, staffing, product development, and resource-
access mechanisms (North, 1990;Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008;Peng, 2003;Brouthers, 
2002;Jackson and Deeg, 2008;Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008;Gaur, Delios and Singh, 
2007;Chan, Isobe and Makino, 2008). As MNEs operate in multiple institutional contexts, they 
face a multitude of political and social stakeholders with different and often conflicting 
expectations. Differences between MNEs’ home and host institutions often put MNEs in a 
dilemma – i.e. whether a firm (in specific host contexts) should interact with external 
stakeholders in ways that are considered ‘internally’ legitimate i.e. with respect to firms’ core 
values and morals, as against what is considered ‘externally’ legitimate with respect to the 
isomorphic pressures in individual host countries (Hillman and Wan, 2005;Doh et al., 2012). 
Studies suggest that stronger regulatory institutions in MNEs’ home countries, characterised by 
greater political stability, better law enforcement, control of corruption and effective 
governance encourage the use of lobbying (via information exchange) as against the use of 
other illegitimate forms of influence such as bribery and connections (Campos and Giovannoni, 
2007). Strong regulatory institutions provide legitimate business-government interfaces that 
pressurise firms to move away from bribery towards lobbying via information (Harstad and 
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Svensson, 2011). Although differences between political systems (autocratic vs. democratic) 
and firm and industry-level heterogeneity also determine the use and effectiveness of lobbying 
(Hillman et al., 2004), in general, firms are more likely to adopt lobbying in political systems 
characterised by high levels of stability and institutional development.  
Second, the organisational imprinting theory (Stinchcombe, 1965) argues that the 
‘founding’ conditions of organisations have implications on their future actions. Imprinting 
theory argues that conditions in the external environmental surrounding firms at the time of 
their founding ‘get stamped’ onto organisational behaviour, and that these characteristics persist 
even in the face of subsequent environmental changes (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013;Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1990;Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006;Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2012). 
Imprinting theory suggests that under common conditions of uncertainty, managers are likely 
to develop common ‘mental models’ of interpreting the environment and taking actions 
(Denzau and North, 1994). Home-institutional imprinting, in this context, refers to the common 
external constraints faced by MNEs in their home environments – levels of political stability, 
government effectiveness, corruption, that create similar perceptions of risk among firms 
founded in these environments. These subsequently have a lasting effect on firms’ political 
knowledge and the capabilities developed to deal with uncertainties (Holburn and Zelner, 
2010). Thus the home country’s institutional environment can provide the firm with elements 
of ‘political knowledge’ (Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 2015) that, we suggest, has an imprinting 
effect when they subsequently operate in a foreign environment. Lobbying, in our case, as a 
means of interacting with policymakers in a host country, thus depends on the imprinting effect 
of political knowledge developed by MNEs in their home countries. We therefore argue that 
the use of lobbying in a host country depends on the extent to which regulatory institutions in 
the MNE’s home country have developed to support this activity. 
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The effect of home-institutional imprinting on MNEs’ overseas lobbying expenses  
As previously described, stronger regulatory institutions facilitate lobbying, whereas 
weaker institutions reduce the scope of lobbying. This is because institutional voids and 
unstable governments reduce the effectiveness of lobbying and increases the scope of using 
other alternatives (such as bribery and connections) (Campos and Giovannoni, 2007;Harstad 
and Svensson, 2011). Therefore MNEs founded in home countries with well-developed 
institutions develop generic political knowledge of lobbying, whereas, MNEs founded in home 
countries with weaker regulatory institutions develop more specific nonmarket capabilities such 
as in exploiting family or political connections (Sheng, Zhou and Li, 2011;Shirodkar and Mohr, 
2015a;Zhou et al., 2008). In either case, this forms an important part of an MNE’s political 
knowledge embedded in its people (i.e. employees engaged in lobbying) and organisational 
routines deployed in interacting with the nonmarket environment (Bonardi, 2011;Bonardi and 
Vanden Bergh, 2015). In line with imprinting theory, such knowledge and capabilities are 
imprinted within MNEs, such that managers would find it difficult to ‘unlearn’ the habits and 
routines when faced with a new environment (de Holan, Phillips and Lawrence, 2004;Zahra, 
Abdelgawad and Tsang, 2011). Thus, due to the imprinting effect of the MNEs’ home 
environment, managers would (cognitively) perceive the adoption of new practices in host 
countries as uncertain and risky as well as socially unjustifiable to their organisational values 
and norms (Oliver, 1997). We therefore expect that stronger regulatory institutions at home 
increase MNEs’ generic knowledge of lobbying; and due to the imprinting effects of such 
knowledge, such MNEs will be more likely to lobby in their host environments. Based on this 
we formulate our hypothesis: 
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H1: MNEs founded in countries with stronger regulatory institutions are likely to 
spend higher on lobbying the host-government than those founded in countries with 
weaker regulatory institutions. 
The moderating effect of experience  
 Imprinting theory suggests that the imprinting effect of external environments on the 
firm is greater among newer organisations than among older organisations (Carroll and Hannan, 
1989;Freeman et al., 1983). Under the ‘liabilities of newness’ concept (Stinchcombe, 1965), 
new-born organisations face greater chances of mortality than older organisations due to their 
lack of experience, and due to their greater reliance on ‘strangers’ whom they must trust in the 
process of building ties and relationships. In this context, we suggest that the imprinting effect 
of MNEs’ home environment to pursue lobbying in host countries reduces with their overall 
experience and with the specific experience within the host country. This is because of the 
following reasons. 
 As previously argued, firms founded in countries with stronger regulatory institutions 
are expected to develop greater capabilities in lobbying as compared to firms founded in 
countries with weaker regulatory institutions; and this has an imprinting effect on their political 
knowledge and capabilities. Within this context, new-born firms are faced with relatively 
specific external stakeholders that control specific resources critical for their survival (Freeman 
et al., 1983). Therefore in order to survive, new-born firms – as compared to older firms – tend 
to develop specialised  knowledge about external institutional conditions with rare or unique 
features to understand the regulatory or policymaking process (Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 
2015). Such specialised political knowledge and capabilities imprinted within new-born firms 
are less likely to be useful in other institutional settings – e.g. when such firms expand their 
operations overseas. However, as firms grow older, they face a multitude of external 
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stakeholders, and this causes them to develop greater ‘generic political knowledge’, i.e. 
knowledge about a variety of regulatory frameworks and how the policymaking process differs 
among various institutional settings (Delios and Henisz, 2003b, a;Holburn and Zelner, 
2010;Perkins, 2014;Zhou and Guillén, 2015). Such generic political knowledge can be 
deployed across various institutional settings and complemented with more specific knowledge 
of the host country (Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 2015;Zhou and Guillén, 2015). We therefore 
expect that the political knowledge imprinted within firms at the time of founding is likely to 
fade away with experience in general.  
 Similarly, MNEs’ specific experience within the host-country is likely to reduce the 
imprinting effect of their political knowledge developed within home countries. This is because, 
MNEs new to a host country lack the specific knowledge of regulatory and other stakeholders’ 
expectations, and therefore generally suffer from liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 
1995;Stevens, Xie and Peng, 2015). Under these conditions, the imprinted knowledge of their 
home institutions forms an important part of their strategic decisions in the host country. 
However, with greater experience of the host-political context, MNEs learn to identify optimal 
areas of complementarity with various external stakeholders (Luo and Peng, 1999;Moeller, 
Harvey, Griffith and Richey, 2013). Host-country experience also enables MNEs to learn to 
manage the ‘unfamiliarity and relational hazards’ in the host-political context (Gaur and Lu, 
2007;Delios and Henisz, 2003b;Henisz, 2003;Hitt, Li and Xu, 2016;Shirodkar and Konara, 
2016) and gain the necessary institution-specific political knowledge – e.g. knowledge of 
specific politicians’ policy preferences on a given topic, or the procedures governing decision-
making (Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 2015). Consequently the imprinting effect of political 
knowledge developed within their home country is likely to fade away with greater host-country 
experience. Therefore we suggest that:   
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H2a: The imprinting effect of home-country regulatory institutions on lobbying in a 
host country reduces with an MNE’s overall experience. 
H2b: The imprinting effect of home-country regulatory institutions on lobbying in a 
host country reduces with an MNE’s host-country experience. 
The moderating effect of MNEs’ technological intensity 
 Imprinting theory suggests that the effect of the external environment stamped on firms’ 
behaviour may also vary by the extent to which a firm develops technological and innovative 
capabilities (Felin and Zenger, 2009;Hsu and Lim, 2013). In particular, technological 
capabilities developed by firms reduce the imprinting effects of external institutions. Hsu and 
Lim (2013), for instance, suggest that managers within technologically intensive firms 
cognitively develop greater capabilities in ‘exploring’ and ‘habitually seeking opportunities to 
reapply knowledge’ to offer innovative products and services in markets that extend beyond 
their local institutional boundaries. Taking this argument to the context of MNEs, we suggest 
that MNEs’ technological intensity reduces the imprinting effect of home-country regulatory 
institutions on lobbying overseas. This is because of the following reasons. 
 Technologically intensive MNEs often have greater fixed costs associated to fewer 
innovative products, and are therefore motivated to internationalise in various leading markets 
at the same time, regardless of institutional differences between their home and host countries 
(Madsen and Servais, 1997). For instance, high-tech start-ups often internationalise in an 
accelerated fashion (e.g. by exporting at founding stages) wherein they rely on a trustworthy 
network of international partners having both market and nonmarket capabilities (Madsen and 
Servais, 1997;Bloodgood, Sapienza and Almeida, 1996;Pla-Barber and Escribá-Esteve, 2006). 
In addition, consistent with literature on ‘technological clusters’ (Porter, Whittington and 
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Powell, 2005), the continued survival and success of technologically intensive MNEs depends 
on the extent to which their managers (or export partners) develop long-term socio-political 
relationships in various host-countries and tap into multiple sources of knowledge (Ambos and 
Birkinshaw, 2010;Figueiredo, 2011). This increases the need for such MNEs to embed in 
multiple institutional settings and interact with a diverse network of foreign government 
agencies, universities and research institutes on a continuous basis (Ciabuschi, Holm and 
Martín, 2014;Figueiredo, 2011;Meyer et al., 2011). Technologically intensive MNEs thus 
develop ‘generic political knowledge’ in this process and are likely to have lesser home-
institutional imprinting effects.  
 By contrast, firms investing lesser in technological and innovative capabilities derive 
their competitive advantage from ‘exploiting’ their existing knowledge and capabilities rather 
than exploring new sources of knowledge (Hsu and Lim, 2013;March, 1991). Among such 
firms, the external institutional constraints and pressures play a greater role in the firm’s 
survival and success, and the ability to manage these constraints better than competitors forms 
an important source of their advantage. While operating in host-countries, such ingrained 
capabilities within technologically less-intensive MNEs cause them to rely on their well-
founded knowledge and institutional linkages developed through embedding deeply within 
their home-country institutional environment (Oliver, 1997;Gulati, 1999;Boddewyn, 2015). 
The imprinting effect of home-institutions is therefore likely to be greater among 
technologically less-intensive MNEs. Based on this we propose that: 
H3: The imprinting effect of home regulatory institutions on lobbying in a host 
country reduces with an MNE’s technological intensity.    
Methodology 
Research context and Sample 
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 We collected our firm level data from Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS database and the 
lobbying data from the Center of Responsive Politics (CRP; www.opensecrets.org). We 
selected the largest 500 MNEs1 operating in U.S. The CRP does not include bribes and other 
forms of obtaining political influence, and therefore has been used in several studies on 
lobbying in the past (Duso and Jung, 2007;Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2009;Mattozzi, 
2008;Schuler et al., 2002). Our final sample consists of 378 firms spanning the 8 year period: 
2006-2013, representing 29 home countries (see Table 1 for a full list countries represented by 
this dataset and the breakdown of the number of MNEs for each home country). Altogether, 
there are 2863 firm year observations. 
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
Measures 
 We measured lobbying expenditure by the total expense incurred by an MNE on 
lobbying in the U.S. in a given year. This is our dependent variable.  
 Our key explanatory variable is the institutional imprinting of the MNE’s home country. 
We operationalised this variable using Kaufmann’s Worldwide Governance Indicators that 
have been most popularly used as a measure of the quality of formal institutions (Dikova, 
2009;Kolstad and Wiig, 2012). For each country, six dimensions of governance, i.e. Voice and 
Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS), Government 
Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of Corruption 
(CC) are reported in Worldwide Governance Indicators. We also used a composite institutional 
variable (GOV) constructed by carrying out factor analysis2 on these six governance indicators.  
                                                             
1 The choice of firms was based on the data availability. 
2 This composite variable accounted for 99% of the variance of the variance of the six 
Governance Indicators.  
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 Guided by previous literature and empirical evidence, we included several control 
variables. First, we control for MNE’s size and age, together, they capture the MNE’s resources, 
capabilities and reputation, as discussed in prior studies (Hillman and Wan, 2005). In order to 
control for the size of the U.S. operation, we include a number of U.S.-based subsidiaries of the 
MNE. We also control for the MNEs’ status, i.e. whether the MNE is a publicly listed firm or 
not. We also control for the technological intensity of the MNE, which has been recognised to 
affect lobbying (Ozer and Lee, 2009). We operationalised technological intensity by dividing 
the number of patents by the total assets of the MNE. Number of patents registered under a firm 
is often used as a measure of intangible assets that the firm possess (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003). 
 In addition to the firm level determinants, we also included several host country specific 
variables that could potentially affect the lobbying activities. We include the economic growth 
rate of the host country (i.e. U.S.), because this has been previously argued to affect the extent 
to which firms would engage in political activities (Rama, 1993). Since political activities by 
firms have been found to increase during election cycles (Hart, 2001), we include a dummy 
variable to control for whether there was presidential election in the U.S. during our timeframe 
(i.e. 2006-2013). We also control for the financial crisis (i.e. for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009) 
using a dummy, because this has been previously argued to increase firms’ involvement in 
lobbying (Sikka, 2009). In addition, we control for cultural factors that have been previously 
argued to affect lobbying in an international context (MacArthur, 1996). We include a 
composite measure of cultural distance based on the 9 cultural dimensions reported in GLOBE 
study: assertiveness, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, future orientation, gender 
egalitarianism, humane orientation, performance orientation, power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance. Following prior research (Schwens, Eiche and Kabst, 2011), we selected the 
‘practices’ indices of these 9 dimentions and constructed a cultural distance measure based on 
Kogut and Singh’s (1988) method, which is the most popular method that have been adopted 
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in constructing a composite measure of cultural distance. Finally, we control for the education 
and skills and the strength of intellectual property protection of the home country. World 
Economic Forum published ‘higher education and training’ measures in the Global 
Competitiveness Index, a composite index based on education, quality of education and on-the-
job-training, and we use this measure to control for the education and skills. We use the Measure 
of intellectual property protection strength published in the same source to control for IPR 
strength. 
 Our baseline specification takes the following form: 
LOBEXP = β0 + β1 HII + β2 TECH + β3 SIZEit + β4 AGEit + β5 NSUBS + β6 PUBLIC + β7 GDPG    
+ β8 CDIST + β9 DIST + β10 ELECTION + β11 FCRISIS+ β12 HC+ β13 IPR 
where LOBEXP and HII are lobbying expenses and home-institutional imprinting of the MNE, 
respectively. SIZE and AGE are the log values of MNEs’ operating revenue and the age, 
respectively. NSUBS is the number of U.S. subsidiaries of the MNE. PUBLIC is a dummy 
variable to capture whether the MNE is a public limited company (PUBLIC =1) or not 
(PUBLIC =0). TECH is the technological intensity. GDPG is the GDP growth rate in the U.S. 
CDIST and DIST are the cultural distance and geographic distance between the home country 
and the U.S., respectively. ELECTION is a dummy variable capturing whether a presidential 
election has taken place in a particular year (=1) or not in the U.S. FCRISIS is a dummy variable 
representing the effects of financial crisis that takes the value of 1 for years 2007, 2008 and 
2009. HC is the education and skills of the home country and IPR is the intellectual property 
protection of the home country. USEXP measures the MNEs experience in US, i.e. the number 
of years from the MNEs first entry to U.S. Similar to AGE, we used the log value of this 
measure. This variable is used to examine the moderating effect of U.S experience on the 
relationship between home-institutional imprinting and lobbying. We compiled this variable by 
16 
 
going through the annual reports and the corporate websites of the respective MNEs, however, 
we could not find this information for all the MNEs, hence our sample for the model that tests 
the moderating effect of U.S. experience on the relationship between home institutional 
imprinting and lobbying is smaller compared to the sample of the baseline model. Finally, we 
include a series of industry dummies3 to control for other industry-level characteristics that 
could potentially impact any lobbying activities. It is important to control for industry fixed-
effects as not only the extent of lobbying activities can vary among industries, but also lobbying 
activities can be affected by differences in industry-level regulations. The sources of all 
variables and their measurements are summarized in Appendix 1. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are presented in Table 2. The 
worldwide governance indicators used as measures of institutional distance are highly 
correlated with each other (as expected), but this is not a problem because we have used each 
indicator in a separate regression model. All estimations were estimated with cluster4 robust 
standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity.  
*** Insert Table 2 about here *** 
 Table 3 presents the results for the direct effect of home-institutional imprinting on 
MNEs’ lobbying expenditure. First column reports the estimated results for the composite 
                                                             
3 Industry fixed effects were defined at the following industry classification: A - Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing, B - Mining and quarrying, C - Manufacturing, D - Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply, E - Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities, F – 
Construction, G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, H - 
Transportation and storage, I - Accommodation and food service activities, J - Information and 
communication, K - Financial and insurance activities, L - Real estate activities, M - Professional, 
scientific and technical activities, N - Administrative and support service activities, O - Public 
administration and defence; compulsory social security, S - Other service activities 
4 We clustered the standard errors at both the country level and the sector level. 
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institutional variable (GOV) and the rest of the columns reports the results estimated for 
individual measures of six governance indicators. With regard to the direct effect of institutional 
imprinting of the MNE’s home country, our models 3.1 through 3.7 show that estimated 
coefficients of all seven institutional imprinting variables are positive. In model 3.1, the 
composite institutional variable is positive and significant (p<0.01). In models 3.2-3.7; except 
for political stability, all other measures of governance indicators are significant. The 
magnitude of the estimated effect is considerably large. For example, in model 3.1 the estimated 
coefficient of the home-institutional imprinting variable is 317.6. This means, one unit increase 
in the home-institutional imprinting variable will increase lobbying expenditure by US$ 
317,600. This effect is considerably large given that the average lobbying expenditure in our 
sample is US$ 368,260.  We also split the total sample into two groups at the median value of 
the composite institutional variable (GOV) and carried out the analysis for the two samples 
separately. Results are reported in Table 4. The estimated coefficient of the home-institutional 
imprinting variable is positive and significant in both samples. The coefficient of GOV is about 
seven times larger in the sample with countries with institutional value above the median as 
compared to that of the other sample. This shows that MNEs from institutionally advanced 
countries are very active in lobbying in the US.  
*** Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here *** 
 To examine the moderating effect of the MNE’s general experience on the home-
institutional imprinting - lobbying expenditure relationship, we interact the institutional  
imprinting variables with the age (AGE) of the MNE, and the estimated results are reported in 
Table 5. The interaction term is negative in all estimations except that with government 
effectiveness (GE), and the interaction term is significant in two estimations. The magnitude of 
the marginal effects of home-institutional imprinting decrease considerably when MNE’s 
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general experience increases, at least in some of the estimations. For example, in model 5.2, the 
marginal effect of home-institutional imprinting decreases from 465.2 to 133.9 when MNE’s 
general experience increases from its lowest value to the highest value.  
*** Insert Table 5 about here *** 
 To examine the moderating effect of MNEs’ host-country experience on the 
institutional imprinting - lobbying expenditure relationship, we interact the institutional 
imprinting variables with US experience of the MNE (USEXP), and the estimated results are 
reported in Table 6. As expected, the interaction term is negative in all estimations except one. 
However, none of the coefficients are significant.  
*** Insert Table 6 about here *** 
 Next, we include our interaction term between home-institutional imprinting and the 
technological intensity (TECH) in our model and the results are reported in Table 7. The 
interaction term is negative in all seven models. It is significant in all models except for political 
stability and regulatory quality. The magnitude of the marginal effects of home-institutional 
imprinting decreases considerably when technological intensity increases. For example, in 
model 7.1, the marginal effect of home-institutional imprinting decreases from 316.3 to 132.4 
when MNE’s technological intensity increases from its lowest value to the highest value.  
*** Insert Table 7 about here *** 
 Among our firm-level control variables (see Table 3), we found that the association 
between MNE size and lobbying expenditure is positive and strongly significant. This means 
that larger-sized MNEs would lobby more as compared to smaller-sized MNEs in the US, thus 
confirming that slack resources would be important for lobbying, as previously studied 
(Hillman and Wan, 2005). Similarly, NSUB shows significant positive association with 
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lobbying expenses, indicating that foreign MNEs having greater number of subsidiaries in the 
U.S. would lobby more, given the importance of the U.S. market. Among our distance-related 
control variables, DIST is significantly negatively associated with lobbying expenses, thus 
confirming that MNEs from geographically distant countries would lobby lesser than those 
from geographically closer countries, similar to studies that have previously examined this link 
(Hamilton and Hoch, 1997). CDIST (cultural distance) is also significantly negatively 
associated with lobbying, indicating that culturally distant countries lobby less. This result 
highlights that cultural factors are also an important factor in overseas lobbying among MNEs. 
In terms of home-country specific control variables, HC is not significant and IPR is 
insignificant in all estimations except one.  Finally, among the host country specific variables, 
FCRISIS and ELECTION are both significantly positively associated with MNEs’ lobbying – 
therefore consistent with past studies, MNEs would lobby more during specific events such as 
financial crises and election cycles (Hart, 2001;Sikka, 2009).  Although some studies have 
argued that firms (in general) lobby more during periods with strong economic conditions 
(Rama, 1993), GDPG (i.e. GDP growth) is not significant in our results.  
 To test the robustness of our results, we re-estimated our estimations by including the 
‘democracy’ indicator (for the home country) published in the Polity IV: Regime Authority 
Characteristics and Transitions Dataset. Our results remained largely intact. We also ran a 
further robustness test by employing the ‘political constraint’ indicator (for the home country)  
from the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) Dataset (Henisz, 2000, 2002). Our results 
remained largely intact again, except for the moderating effect of MNEs’ general experience, 
which became insignificant when POLCON was included. Finally, as a third robustness test, in 
order to test the imprinting effect of a static (time invariant) measure of home-institutions, we 
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used the institutional measure in year 2005 and re-estimated our results. All our results 
remained intact5.  
Discussion  
 Our empirical results provide support to three out of our four hypotheses. First, 
regarding the role of home-institutional imprinting on MNEs’ overseas lobbying expenses, our 
results support our organisational imprinting-based argument that stronger home-institutions 
increase firms’ knowledge of lobbying (as against other types of political activity) (Bonardi, 
2011;Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 2015) making them more likely to use lobbying in their 
overseas operations. The nonmarket behaviour of MNEs in an international context has 
emerged as a central theme in international business research (Boddewyn, 2015). Various 
scholars have investigated these issues from a bargaining-power perspective (Eden and Molot, 
2002;Fagre and Wells Jr, 1982;Ramamurti, 2001;Vernon, 1991), resource-based views and 
resource dependency perspectives (Hillman and Wan, 2005;Shirodkar and Mohr, 
2015a;Blumentritt and Rehbein, 2008;Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994;Puck et al., 2013), and 
institutional perspectives (Doh et al., 2012;Henisz, 2003;Mondejar and Zhao, 2013). We 
contribute to this discussion theoretically as well as empirically by arguing that the imprinting 
effect of an MNE’s home institutions provides an important channel that shapes its managers’ 
political knowledge (Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 2015) and hence its overseas nonmarket 
behaviour. Using organisational imprinting theory as an anchor, we also respond to the call for 
a better integration of the insights provided by this theory into the literature on nonmarket 
strategies in an international context (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). 
                                                             
5 Results of the robustness tests are not presented here but can be made available upon request. 
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 Second, our results partially support our arguments in regard to the moderating effect 
of experience on the relationship between home-institutional imprinting and MNEs’ overseas 
lobbying. In this context, our results support our hypothesis 2a, in which we argue that MNEs’ 
‘overall experience’ reduces the imprinting effect of home-institutions on overseas lobbying. 
Here, our results support our imprinting-based arguments that newer firms have greater 
imprinting effects than older firms (Carroll and Hannan, 1989;Freeman et al., 1983). Our results 
here suggest that older MNEs from stronger institutional settings would possess greater ‘generic 
political knowledge’ (Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 2015) – i.e. beyond the knowledge of 
lobbying that would be naturally imprinted within them as a result of their stronger home 
institutions - thus making them better equipped to use alternative mechanisms (e.g. PAC 
contributions), rather than lobbying in the U.S. Likewise older MNEs from weaker institutional 
settings would also possess greater generic political knowledge, beyond the knowledge of using 
family and other social connections which would have been naturally imprinted within them as 
a result of their weaker home institutions (Campos and Giovannoni, 2007), and such generic 
political knowledge would enable them to engage in lobbying in the US. Thus overall our 
results suggest that MNEs’ generic experience reduces the imprinting effects of home 
institutions, as also recognised in some recent studies (Perkins, 2014;Stevens et al., 2015;Zhou 
and Guillén, 2015).  
 With regard to the role of specific host country experience, in line with experiential 
learning perspectives (Delios and Henisz, 2003b;Delios and Beamish, 2001), we had expected 
that (in our hypothesis 2b), with greater experience in the U.S., the imprinting effect of MNEs 
home country institutions would also reduce in the same way. Our results, however, only 
partially support this – i.e. although the sign of the interaction term is negative (in line with our 
arguments), the coefficients are not significant. A first theoretical explanation for this slightly 
unexpected finding could be that, due to MNEs’ embeddedness in various institutional contexts, 
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their general experience plays a greater role in reducing the imprinting effect of home-
institutions than their experience in the host-country. Recent studies suggest that the lack of 
host-country experience can be mitigated by MNEs’ experience of operating in other similar 
institutional settings (Perkins, 2014;Powell and Rhee, 2013). Thus, in our case, MNEs’ lack of 
U.S. experience could have been mitigated by their experience in other institutional settings  
similar to the U.S. Another tentative explanation for this finding could be that, in the U.S., CPA 
mechanisms other than lobbying – e.g. PAC contributions, were legitimised only recently 
(Levitt, 2015). Thus, within the timeframe of our panel data, lobbying has remained the 
dominant mechanism of CPA for foreign firms in the U.S., reducing the scope to use alternative 
mechanisms. We suggest that both of these aspects remain important limitations of our study 
and warrant further research. 
 Finally, our results also confirm that MNEs’ technological intensity reduces the effect 
of home-institutional imprinting on overseas lobbying expenses. This supports our argument 
(in line with h3) that, due to the greater embeddedness of technologically intensive MNEs in 
multiple institutional contexts (Figueiredo, 2011;Meyer et al., 2011), such MNEs are more 
likely to develop ‘generic political knowledge’ (Bonardi and Vanden Bergh, 2015), thus 
reducing the imprinting effects of their home-institutions. In this context, we contribute to some 
recent studies that emphasise that managers of technologically intensive MNEs develop 
routines and processes that enable them to develop innovative products that can be sold in a 
variety of international markets; which reduces the need to adapt to the constraints of the local 
institutional environment, thus mitigating home imprinting effects (Hsu and Lim, 2013;Katila 
and Ahuja, 2002). We also contribute to studies in international business that have highlighted 
the importance of embeddedness in multiple institutional contexts for innovative MNEs 
(Ambos and Birkinshaw, 2010;Bloodgood et al., 1996;Ciabuschi et al., 2014;Hitt et al., 
2016;Pla-Barber and Escribá-Esteve, 2006;Renko, Carsrud and Brännback, 2009), by 
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suggesting that such embeddedness reduce home imprinting effects in overseas political 
behaviour.   
Conclusion   
 Our key contribution lies in enhancing theory on the nonmarket behaviour of MNEs in 
an international context. We do so by examining the extent to which MNEs’ home-country 
influences the political knowledge and capabilities that MNEs develop, and transfer this 
knowledge to their overseas locations. Using insights from organisational imprinting theory 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) and recent work on MNEs’ political knowledge (Bonardi and Vanden 
Bergh, 2015;Boddewyn, 2015), we explain that institutional conditions in MNEs’ home 
countries affect their overseas lobbying behaviour. We also argue and find that MNEs’ overall 
experience reduces the imprinting effects of its home institutions. Here we contribute to 
imprinting theory’s ‘liabilities of newness’ concept (Freeman et al., 1983) by suggesting that 
political knowledge imprinted within MNEs affects newer firms more than older firms while 
lobbying overseas. Finally, we acknowledge the fact that MNEs’ technological intensity also 
reduces home-institutional imprinting effects while undertaking nonmarket activities abroad. 
In this context, we contribute to studies that focus on how MNEs technological and innovation 
capabilities have complex effects on their political knowledge, and the extent to which this can 
have implications while operating overseas (Driffield, Love and Yang, 2014;Li and Kozhikode, 
2009;Pearce, 1999). In sum, we suggest that political knowledge derived from the 
institutionally developed home-country environments enables firms originating from such 
environments to be more comfortable with lobbying overseas. We thus provide a more precise 
and fuller explanation to explain the choice a firm makes in undertaking nonmarket activities 
in a foreign host country. In doing so, we also advance the stream of research that focuses on 
the home-country as a resource (Lawton et al., 2013a;Driffield et al., 2014;Hong, Wang and 
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Kafouros, 2015), showing the extent to which political knowledge gained in the home country 
can be leveraged while operating overseas.  
 Our study provides several implications for managers of foreign MNEs doing business 
overseas, and particularly in the U.S. Mainly, our study shows that, due to home-institutional 
imprinting effects, managers of foreign firms from strongly institutionalised countries can 
benefit from the political knowledge developed within their home environments while lobbying 
overseas, particularly if legitimate business-government interfaces are available in the host 
country. On the contrary, managers of foreign firms founded in weakly institutionalized 
countries would refrain from using lobbying in the host country, despite the availability of 
transparent business-government interfaces. For instance, in the late 1980s, Japanese firm 
Toshiba was accused by the U.S. government of selling advanced propeller technology used in 
submarines to the Soviet Union in violation of the Coordinating Committee for Export Controls 
(COCOM). This led to potential boycott of Toshiba products in the U.S. by the U.S. Department 
of Defense and by other private companies. Toshiba responded by pledging not to make any 
illegal sales in the future, and by undertaking a lobbying and grassroots mobilisation campaign 
to inform the Congress that such sanctions would harm Toshiba’s U.S. investments that 
involved more than 4,000 U.S. workers (Baron, 2003). As an outcome, Toshiba faced much 
fewer sanctions than previously expected. In contrast, in another instance, Jay Kim, a U.S. 
Congressman was convicted of accepting campaign contributions from South Korean 
companies in the mid-1990s. Campaign contributions were regarded as illegal at that time when 
accepted from subsidiaries of foreign firms (see Gawande, Krishna and Robbins, 2006;Pinkston 
and Carroll, 1994). In this context, Samsung, for instance, was found to be involved and was 
penalised by U.S. government (Rosenzweig, 1996). These two instances indicate that the 
imprinting effect of stronger home institutions in Japan could have led Toshiba to undertake 
information-based lobbying, whereas relatively weaker home-institutions in South Korea could 
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have led its companies to providing illegal campaign contributions despite the availability and 
legitimacy of lobbying in the U.S. Our findings also suggest that managers can reduce the 
imprinting effects of their political knowledge derived from their home institutions via 
experience (both general as well as host-country specific), and via investment in research and 
development activities. For instance, Samsung was newly founded in the 1990s, and therefore 
the imprinting effect of its home institutions could have been greater. On the contrary, Toshiba, 
by the 1980s was much more experienced and technologically intensive, enabling it to use 
additional legitimate political activities such as grassroots mobilisation in addition to lobbying. 
We therefore suggest that both experience and technological intensity enable MNEs to gain 
generic political knowledge of multiple institutional systems, and this could reduce the 
imprinting effect of political knowledge derived from their home countries.    
 Our key limitation is that, first, although lobbying is one of the important political tactics 
used by firms in the U.S. and dominates political spending by corporations (Wood, 1985;De 
Figueiredo and Richter, 2013;Levitt, 2015), other tactics do exist including contributions to 
political action committees (PACs) and coalition building with other interest groups such as 
NGOs and media (Hillman et al., 2004). Due to our data limitations, we are not able to account 
for the variety of tactics used in corporate political activities by MNEs. Second, we recognise 
that mechanisms that affect political behaviour of firms can be complex at the home country 
level. In addition to differences in governance factors, differences in institutions also arise from 
varieties of business systems among countries that affect the ways in which capital and labour-
power is organised, economic exchanges and competing interests are governed, the nature and 
policies of the state that affect economic activities, the financial system, and education and 
training systems (Hotho and Pedersen, 2012). Qualitative differences among institutions also 
include dominant beliefs about trust, authority and loyalty, and all these have also been argued 
to affect the competitive advantages of businesses (Whitley, 1992, 1998). We therefore suggest 
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that future research could account for wider aspects of institutions – such as varieties of 
capitalism that may affect MNEs’ overseas nonmarket behaviour. Thirdly, we also  understand 
that MNEs’ political and business ties and their ownership characteristics in their host countries 
can have path dependence effects on their lobbying behaviour in host countries (Sheng et al., 
2011;Shirodkar and Mohr, 2015b). Again, due to our data limitations we are unable to control 
for this. Finally, we also recognise that our measure of technological intensity could have been 
more robust. Although we measure MNEs’ technological intensity using MNEs’ patents, which 
is a widely-accepted measure, using additional measures could have increased the robustness 
of our results. Therefore future research could include a variety of measures of technological 
intensity – e.g. product and process innovation in addition to patents. We suggest that all of 
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Appendix 1: Variable description, measurement, and sources 
Variable Description/Measurement Data Source 
LOBEXP Lobbying expenditure (US$, thousands) Center of Responsive Politics 
SIZE Log (MNE’s operating revenue) ORBIS  
AGE Log (1+ MNE age) ORBIS  
PUBLIC A binary variable which takes the value of one if the 
MNE is a public firm and zero otherwise. 
ORBIS  
TECH Technological Intensity (Number of patents/Total 
assets)  
ORBIS  
NSUBS Number of US based subsidiaries of the MNE ORBIS  
GOV Composite measure of home country institutional 
score based on the 6 dimensions of worldwide 
governance indicators (based on factor analysis) 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
VA Voice and Accountability Worldwide Governance Indicators  
PS Political Stability and Absence of Violence Worldwide Governance Indicators 
GE Government Effectiveness Worldwide Governance Indicators 
RQ Regulatory Quality Worldwide Governance Indicators 
RL Rule of Law Worldwide Governance Indicators 
CC Control of Corruption Worldwide Governance Indicators 
GDPG GDP growth rate in US World Development Indicators 
CDIST A composite measure (calculated  based on Kogut 
and Singh (1988) method) of cultural distance 
between the home and the host country based on the 
9 cultural dimensions reported in GLOBE study: 
assertiveness, institutional collectivism, in-group 
collectivism, future orientation, gender 
egalitarianism, humane orientation, performance 
orientation, power distance, uncertainty avoidance 
(House et al., 2004) 
DIST Geographical distance between the US and home 
country 
Rose and Spiegel (2011) 
FCRISIS A dummy variable taking the value of 1 for years 
2007, 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise 
 
ELECTION A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a 
presidential election has taken place in a particular 
year in US and zero if not. 
 
HC Human capital (Higher education and training) of the 
home country. This is a multi-indicator measure of 
human capital based on secondary and tertiary 
education enrolment rate, quality of the educational 
system, math and science education, and the 
management of schools, internet access in schools, 
local availability of specialized research and training 
services, and the extent of staff training. 
Global Competitiveness Index 
(http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-
competitiveness) 
IPR Measure of intellectual property protection strength 
of the home country 
Global Competitiveness Index 
USEXP Log (1+ the number of years from the MNEs first 
entry to US) 
Annual reports and the corporate 




Table 1: MNEs represented for each home country 


















New Zealand 1 
Portugal 1 





















Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
 
  Correlation coefficients 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 LOBEXP 2863 368.26 1161.42 0 15990                     
2 GOV 2863 -0.1 1.06 -4.33 1.34 0.15                    
3 CC 2863 1.24 0.82 -1.3 2.6 0.15 0.98                   
4 GE 2863 1.31 0.6 -1.2 2.4 0.13 0.97 0.94                  
5 PS 2863 0.56 0.6 -1.6 1.5 0.08 0.84 0.83 0.84                 
6 RQ 2863 1.14 0.61 -1.6 2 0.18 0.95 0.92 0.9 0.75                
7 RL 2863 1.2 0.69 -1.8 2 0.15 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.8 0.94               
8 VA 2863 0.92 0.75 -1.7 1.7 0.14 0.82 0.79 0.72 0.66 0.78 0.83              
9 SIZE 2863 10.12 0.78 6.47 13 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.13             
10 AGE 2863 3.73 1.01 0 5.85 -0.01 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.27 0.11            
11 TECH 2863 320.25 1045.48 0 10692.86 -0.02 0.01 0 0.05 0.12 -0.06 0 -0.04 0.06 0.13           
12 PUBLIC 2863 0.83 0.38 0 1 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0 0.11 0.08          
13 NSUBS 2863 126.71 242.08 0 1000 0.14 0.2 0.2 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.05 -0.06 -0.12         
14 GDPG 2863 1.31 1.79 -2.8 2.78 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0 0 0        
15 DIST 2863 5644.85 1404.33 1076.36 9449.91 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.08 -0.04 -0.23 -0.16 -0.38 -0.15 -0.05 0.13 0.01 -0.11 0       
16 CDIST 2863 1.51 0.71 0.12 4.62 -0.12 -0.28 -0.31 -0.21 -0.13 -0.32 -0.27 -0.23 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0 0.09      
17 FCRISIS 2863 0.37 0.48 0 1 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 0 0.01 -0.75 0 0     
18 ELECTION 2863 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.05 -0.01 0 -0.02 -0.02 0 -0.01 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 -0.01 0 0 0.14    
19 HC 2863 5.17 0.51 3.6 6.27 0.11 0.9 0.86 0.91 0.8 0.84 0.9 0.75 0.08 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.13 -0.14 -0.06 -0.13 0   
20 IPR 2863 5.21 0.88 1.64 6.33 0.13 0.91 0.9 0.91 0.78 0.83 0.91 0.68 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.19 0 -0.13 -0.33 0.06 0.01 0.83  
21 USEXP* 2158 3.10 1.07 0.00 5.16 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.10 0.26 -0.02 0.03 0.14 0.02 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.21 0.19 









Table 3: Direct effect of institutional imprinting on lobbying  
 
 HII=GOV HII = CC HII = GE HII = PS HII = RQ HII = RL HII = VA 
 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 
HII 317.6*** 255.3*** 479.2** 137.4 344.5*** 433.8*** 143.9** 
 (88.49) (96.52) (189.3) (148.0) (97.40) (142.4) (73.29) 
TECH -0.0679*** -0.0598*** -0.0759*** -0.0696*** -0.0630*** -0.0665*** -0.0596*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0210) (0.0263) (0.0235) (0.0204) (0.0216) (0.0225) 
SIZE 151.5*** 147.9*** 156.1*** 141.5*** 151.2*** 145.9*** 138.3*** 
 (46.75) (44.99) (48.48) (43.71) (47.13) (46.61) (44.80) 
AGE -63.02 -64.88 -55.46 -56.38 -52.57 -61.98 -68.92 
 (49.71) (49.64) (49.92) (50.21) (49.29) (50.32) (51.56) 
PUBLIC 17.74 33.86 23.09 46.46 35.21 16.78 33.45 
 (118.3) (118.7) (120.8) (125.0) (120.7) (118.8) (123.6) 
NSUBS 0.656* 0.696* 0.682* 0.727* 0.669 0.664* 0.717* 
 (0.393) (0.404) (0.390) (0.421) (0.409) (0.387) (0.407) 
GDPG 5.332 3.478 0.353 -5.696 -3.468 5.462 -2.985 
 (7.170) (6.993) (7.442) (6.653) (7.227) (6.731) (6.112) 
DIST -0.0900*** -0.0947*** -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.0851*** -0.0935*** -0.0846*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0317) (0.0301) (0.0257) (0.0324) 
CDIST -156.5* -176.8* -187.2** -229.2** -167.2 -170.9** -214.8** 
 (88.33) (97.98) (86.89) (106.1) (101.9) (82.10) (99.64) 
FCRISIS 147.1** 159.8** 117.0* 131.8* 116.0* 150.4** 134.5* 
 (70.77) (72.85) (64.95) (70.88) (68.15) (71.04) (70.17) 
ELECTION 109.8*** 101.4*** 123.1*** 108.4*** 110.1*** 108.5*** 104.6*** 
 (34.17) (33.45) (36.41) (32.49) (33.84) (33.67) (32.75) 
HC -143.9 -13.10 -149.3 45.27 -52.80 -105.0 42.08 
 (125.9) (133.6) (131.1) (181.1) (137.1) (118.9) (137.0) 
IPR -230.2* -201.5 -206.2 -159.8 -180.5 -228.2 -155.8 
 (134.3) (122.5) (139.7) (117.4) (125.8) (142.8) (126.6) 
Constant 1,780*** 616.7 1,102* 558.9 529.8 1,165* 494.6 
 (610.1) (524.3) (581.0) (651.0) (498.9) (607.0) (660.2) 
N 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 
Firms 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
R2 0.155 0.151 0.152 0.137 0.154 0.153 0.138 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 













Table 4: Direct effect of institutional imprinting on lobbying (with splitting the sample 
at the median value of institutional variable) 
 Countries with institutional 
value below the median 
Countries with institutional 
value above the median 
 4.1 4.2 
HII (= GOV) 103.7*** 700.8*** 
 (30.65) (213.5) 
TECH -0.0292*** -0.0715* 
 (0.0113) (0.0370) 
SIZE 114.3** 281.3*** 
 (50.86) (95.17) 
AGE -32.65 -83.58 
 (72.94) (67.37) 
PUBLIC 86.98 43.38 
 (62.29) (156.3) 
NSUBS 0.385 0.645 
 (0.247) (0.426) 
GDPG 0.0776 11.59 
 (4.554) (13.59) 
DIST -0.0354 -0.145*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0414) 
CDIST -41.22 -172.1** 
 (108.4) (86.92) 
FCRISIS 61.83* 153.5 
 (32.00) (116.5) 
ELECTION 25.36 213.6*** 
 (26.01) (63.57) 
HC -134.3 -410.5 
 (106.3) (307.0) 
IPR -33.99 -425.6 
 (36.87) (263.9) 
Constant 500.5 3,681** 
 (467.6) (1,785) 
N 1,422 1,441 
Firms 246 274 
R2 0.101 0.196 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Table 5: Moderating effect of MNE’s general experience on Home Institutional 
Imprinting - Lobbying relationship 
 
 HII=GOV HII = CC HII = GE HII = PS HII = RQ HII = RL HII = VA 
 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 
HII* AGE -18.00 -54.37* 3.003 -87.54* -31.49 -17.59 -7.046 
 (25.42) (32.36) (55.70) (47.34) (47.82) (35.68) (37.64) 
HII 381.2*** 452.0*** 468.3** 465.2** 458.5*** 496.2** 165.9 
 (121.4) (129.4) (223.3) (185.0) (177.8) (197.1) (130.5) 
AGE -62.35 6.022 -59.62 -3.946 -12.62 -39.27 -62.07 
 (49.15) (52.98) (75.07) (54.71) (59.38) (54.66) (49.39) 
TECH -0.0671*** -0.0586*** -0.0760*** -0.0660*** -0.0626*** -0.0661*** -0.0595*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0211) (0.0267) (0.0233) (0.0205) (0.0218) (0.0228) 
SIZE 149.2*** 143.3*** 156.2*** 137.4*** 148.9*** 144.4*** 137.4*** 
 (46.56) (44.56) (48.38) (43.60) (46.11) (46.65) (45.13) 
PUBLIC 17.71 32.72 23.21 42.25 34.92 17.04 34.25 
 (118.4) (118.7) (120.3) (124.7) (120.9) (119.1) (124.2) 
NSUBS 0.667* 0.721* 0.681* 0.742* 0.678 0.671* 0.721* 
 (0.399) (0.411) (0.397) (0.424) (0.419) (0.390) (0.410) 
GDPG 5.559 3.863 0.337 -4.801 -3.162 5.646 -2.920 
 (7.082) (6.905) (7.350) (6.717) (7.092) (6.694) (6.151) 
DIST -0.0887*** -0.0914*** -0.107*** -0.105*** -0.0838*** -0.0927*** -0.0845*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0300) (0.0299) (0.0315) (0.0294) (0.0260) (0.0325) 
CDIST -153.3* -168.1* -187.5** -223.3** -163.8* -168.8** -214.5** 
 (87.06) (96.27) (85.55) (105.3) (99.14) (81.63) (99.25) 
FCRISIS 146.7** 158.2** 116.9* 132.2* 116.4* 150.1** 134.5* 
 (70.57) (72.05) (64.99) (70.84) (68.31) (70.98) (70.10) 
ELECTION 109.7*** 101.7*** 123.2*** 107.8*** 109.9*** 108.5*** 104.6*** 
 (34.28) (33.40) (36.70) (32.82) (33.87) (33.76) (32.76) 
HC -150.3 -27.11 -148.8 31.56 -59.48 -110.2 40.70 
 (125.5) (130.4) (129.7) (179.1) (133.0) (121.2) (137.0) 
IPR -230.1* -203.1* -206.3 -163.8 -181.2 -227.9 -156.0 
 (134.3) (123.2) (139.7) (117.7) (126.5) (142.8) (126.7) 
Constant 1,830*** 461.4 1,114* 472.4 439.8 1,125* 490.7 
 (627.8) (499.0) (586.6) (631.1) (471.2) (578.4) (651.5) 
N 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 
Firms 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
R2 0.154 0.151 0.152 0.136 0.153 0.152 0.137 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 



















Table 6: Moderating effect of Host country experience on Home Institutional 
Imprinting - Lobbying relationship 
 
 
 HII=GOV HII = CC HII = GE HII = PS HII = RQ HII = RL HII = VA 
 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 
HII* USEXP -5.366 -27.45 -4.643 -65.87 -47.11 -3.603 6.370 
 (31.88) (49.24) (57.70) (79.83) (66.03) (39.01) (37.19) 
HII 441.0*** 456.3*** 727.0** 356.2** 512.4** 561.7** 149.4 
 (159.0) (170.9) (302.7) (173.9) (200.7) (239.1) (133.5) 
USEXP -3.289 33.21 9.510 33.53 57.40 1.623 -4.668 















 (0.0217) (0.0208) (0.0275) (0.0251) (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0243) 
SIZE 174.7*** 170.6*** 183.7*** 164.0*** 170.6*** 167.9*** 161.3*** 
 (63.74) (61.05) (66.87) (59.17) (62.98) (63.55) (60.70) 
AGE -105.9* -107.9* -95.71 -91.74 -88.90 -102.1 -106.1* 
 (61.26) (60.04) (61.17) (63.48) (59.85) (62.18) (63.13) 
PUBLIC -77.68 -61.18 -85.51 -50.70 -59.06 -77.37 -63.69 
 (166.1) (164.4) (167.7) (167.9) (168.7) (168.1) (171.8) 
NSUBS 0.643 0.687 0.663 0.731 0.674 0.653 0.708 
 (0.442) (0.454) (0.431) (0.468) (0.461) (0.435) (0.451) 
GDPG 11.92 10.30 6.279 -3.139 -1.022 11.17 -0.812 
 (9.477) (9.235) (9.848) (8.740) (9.327) (9.069) (8.423) 
DIST -0.100*** -0.105*** -0.128*** -0.125*** -0.0978** -0.104*** -0.0946** 
 (0.0353) (0.0386) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0399) (0.0342) (0.0421) 
CDIST -204.6** -222.0** -241.2** -295.8*** -230.1** -226.3** -280.1** 
 (97.83) (107.9) (95.25) (112.9) (114.6) (91.54) (111.0) 
FCRISIS 207.2** 226.7** 166.6** 185.6** 169.7* 210.4** 188.6** 
 (90.02) (92.61) (81.76) (90.71) (88.40) (90.42) (90.09) 
ELECTION 129.3*** 116.4*** 149.5*** 126.5*** 128.5*** 127.4*** 121.0*** 
 (41.36) (40.01) (43.97) (38.76) (40.90) (40.67) (39.18) 
HC -136.6 16.00 -178.3 122.8 20.63 -64.74 134.8 
 (134.6) (147.1) (156.1) (201.5) (150.2) (127.2) (153.4) 
IPR -305.7* -273.0* -286.4* -211.6 -230.7 -297.9* -203.5 
 (158.4) (140.8) (167.4) (133.8) (147.2) (168.9) (146.5) 
Constant 2,293*** 717.3 1,518** 525.3 424.4 1,338* 417.8 
 (875.0) (685.4) (757.3) (902.9) (663.6) (777.4) (849.6) 
N 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 
Firms 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 
R2 0.174 0.170 0.176 0.149 0.166 0.170 0.152 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Table 7: Moderating effect of Technological intensity on Home Institutional Imprinting 
- Lobbying relationship 
 HII=GOV HII = CC HII = GE HII = PS HII = RQ HII = RL HII = VA 
 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 
HII* TECH -0.0172** -0.0461*** -0.0292* -0.0110 -0.0228 -0.0262* -0.0268** 
 (0.00758) (0.0153) (0.0171) (0.0302) (0.0205) (0.0143) (0.0105) 
HII 316.3*** 263.5*** 478.4** 138.3 345.6*** 431.6*** 146.5** 
 (88.66) (93.56) (189.5) (148.5) (97.62) (142.7) (72.99) 
TECH -0.0773*** -0.0192 -0.0415* -0.0631** -0.0443** -0.0434** -0.0519** 
 (0.0277) (0.0334) (0.0240) (0.0297) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0222) 
SIZE 153.1*** 151.3*** 157.6*** 142.0*** 152.1*** 147.6*** 141.2*** 
 (46.72) (45.33) (48.39) (42.97) (46.89) (46.54) (45.17) 
AGE -61.40 -61.63 -54.15 -55.90 -51.61 -60.41 -66.63 
 (50.17) (50.08) (50.37) (50.67) (49.64) (50.79) (51.89) 
PUBLIC 22.04 41.16 26.83 47.89 37.93 21.11 40.24 
 (118.2) (118.5) (120.7) (124.6) (120.6) (118.7) (123.8) 
NSUBS 0.654* 0.691* 0.680* 0.726* 0.667 0.662* 0.714* 
 (0.393) (0.403) (0.390) (0.422) (0.409) (0.387) (0.406) 
GDPG 4.965 2.686 0.136 -5.712 -3.597 5.131 -3.350 
 (7.180) (6.897) (7.470) (6.690) (7.273) (6.790) (6.105) 
DIST -0.0894*** -0.0932*** -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.0848*** -0.0929*** -0.0831*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0317) (0.0300) (0.0257) (0.0322) 
CDIST -157.0* -177.1* -187.1** -229.4** -167.0 -171.1** -214.2** 
 (88.12) (97.51) (86.77) (106.0) (101.9) (81.96) (99.24) 
FCRISIS 146.1** 155.8** 116.6* 131.7* 115.8* 149.8** 133.8* 
 (70.45) (71.20) (64.80) (70.97) (68.09) (70.92) (69.89) 
ELECTION 109.8*** 102.3*** 122.6*** 108.1*** 110.1*** 108.5*** 104.8*** 
 (34.19) (33.16) (36.55) (32.52) (33.84) (33.69) (32.74) 
HC -139.1 -10.84 -146.0 46.11 -50.26 -100.3 46.19 
 (126.9) (134.0) (131.6) (180.9) (137.1) (119.7) (137.0) 
IPR -227.9* -200.5 -204.0 -159.4 -179.5 -225.6 -153.6 
 (134.6) (123.2) (140.0) (118.4) (126.0) (143.3) (126.6) 
Constant 1,719*** 537.9 1,052* 544.0 495.4 1,104* 413.3 
 (627.9) (531.0) (599.3) (654.0) (506.1) (626.2) (663.8) 
N 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 2,863 
Firms 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
R2 0.155 0.153 0.152 0.137 0.155 0.153 0.139 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Industry specific dummies are not reported for brevity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
